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Abstract 
Data of proportional elections show a striking feature: If the parties are 
ranked according to the number of their voters, the number of votes grows 
exponentially with the rank of the party. This so-called Zipf’s law has been 
reported before. We first show this correlation in results from recent 
elections in Germany, France and republican primaries in the USA. 
However the mechanism generating such feature remains so far 
unexplained. 
 We develop a mathematical model of voter grouping that is only based on 
the word of mouth and not on political contents.  The model is close to the 
infinite allele model and the Ewens sampling formula that are well known in 
population genetics. Strikingly, the model generates output agreeing very 
well with the observed election data. 
We further identify a cannibalism effect in Germany, whereby parties above 
the 5% threshold withdraw votes from parties just below the threshold. We 
demonstrate that the number of parties present in the parliament can be 
predicted given the number of parties standing for election. Finally, the 
steady loss of big-tent parties in Germany in the last 20 years relates to the 
increasing number of parties since 1975. We discuss the interpretation and 
consequences of these findings for modern democracies and the rationality 
or lack thereof of voters’ choices.  
 
 
Significance Statement 
It is known that data from elections exhibit several statistical pattern. Such 
patterns seem to contradict our idea of elections as the rational decision of 
mature citizens. Up to now there are only few or no convincing available 
explanations for these structures. By means of a basic mathematical model 
that does not take into account any political content we are able to 
reproduce the pattern in data from recent elections in Germany, France and 
primaries in the USA. Based on such models it is possible to reveal 
properties in election data and in the dynamics of opinion formation that is 
not recognizable otherwise. However, it is central to interpret models and 
results properly to deepen our understanding of democracies and election 
results, particularly in view of the recently increasing criticisms of the 
democratic process. 
 
Introduction 
Elections are at the heart of modern democracies. It is of outmost interest to understand 
the inherent dynamical processes. Statistical analyses of election data reveal several statistical 
patterns that repeat themselves over a whole range of democracies and elections, namely as the 
relative number of votes per candidate within a given party (1–3) with respect to spatial 
correlations (4–6) or other properties (vote participation, hierarchical model)(7, 8). Perhaps the 
most striking one is the Zipf’s law (9–11) which states that considering the parties/candidates in 
dependency to the number of voters, a double logarithmic plot appear to be linear. The slope is 
sometimes not equal to one (12–15) but can often be one as well (16–18). In contrast to these 
papers, we investigate elections with only few candidates/parties (but at least 10), and find a 
similar result: if the parties are ranked according to the number of votes, the logarithm of the 
number of votes depends linearly on the rank. This indicates an exponential growth of the 
number of voters with the rank of the parties. We find this relationship in proportional elections 
in Germany since 1949, the first round of presidential elections in France (2005, 2012 and 2017) 
and the Republican primaries in the USA (2016)(Figure 1a,b and SI Figures). Such a repeated 
pattern, at several spatial scale (for Germany and France results over large towns, regional unit or 
whole country) hints to an underlying dynamical process that seems to be incompatible with our 
idea of election as a rational decision of mature citizens. In particular in view of recent 
developments in western democracies it is necessary to discuss possible explanations, and to find 
an appropriate interpretation of these observations.  
Much academic work and media analyses are done to predict and better understand the 
results of elections, that is the way voters decide rationally or irrationally, and how parties 
position themselves to maximize their success (19–21). Most models in this field focus on the 
weight of political opinion of voters and the targets (demographic, socio-economic groups) of 
parties. The present paper is based on an alternative argument, namely a neutral dynamics, for 
which the content of the opinion (e.g. left- or right wing, liberal or conservative, …) does not 
play a role. There exist few examples for this kind of dynamics such as the voter model (22) in 
which voters copy the opinion of randomly chosen neighboring voters. The noisy voter model (5, 
23) or Sznajd models (15, 24) are also popular versions of (nonlinear) voter models. In a similar 
spirit to the present paper, Fortunato and Castellano (3) are able to explain a unimodal 
distribution appearing in some election data (Italy, Poland, and Finland) by a linear branching. 
However, the key is to propose an underlying mechanism generating such pattern. We are only 
aware of the approach based on Sznajd models on graphs, see e.g. Gonzales et al. (15), as an 
attempt to reproduce the occurrence of the Zipf’s law. However, the assumption of locality as the 
driving force in opinion formation seems rather unrealistic to explain common results in different 
countries (see more detail in discussion).  
In order to give a more persuading explanation of these empirical findings, we develop a 
model based on a stochastic process to capture the outcome of voters’ decision. The model 
resembles the famous voter model (22, 23) but is based on two well established models of 
population genetics: the infinite allele model (e.g. 25) and the Ewens sampling formula (25–27). 
In particular, the foundation and liquidation of groups (or parties) are an integral part of the 
model, which we therefore call “voter model with party dynamics”. Despite the models relatively 
simplicity, the analysis of data in a quantitative manner was possible, in particular regarding 
predictions on data structure. We indeed recover the log-linear structure observed in the order 
statistics of election results. Based on this model we are able to identify and describe the 
cannibalism effect as a consequence of the threshold introduced in the proportional election 
system. Moreover, we suggest to infer the number of parties present in the parliament based on 
the the number of parties that stand for election. We defer all mathematical work to the 
supplementary information (SI), and focus below on the model approach and results in order to 
insist on the consequences and conclusions of our work for modern democracies.  
 
 
Motivation for the study: the elections in the FRG 
We mainly consider data from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and provide therefore a 
short sketch of the most important facts concerning that election system. Every voter has two 
votes, the ‘first’ and ‘second’ vote. With the first vote, a direct candidate is elected. In the present 
work, we exclusively address the more important second votes, by which an elector votes for a 
party. The parties that receive more than 5% of these votes send representatives into the 
parliament and the number of mandates of a party is proportional to the number of second votes.  
Data for these elections are shown in Figure 1a, b, table 1, and SI section 4 . The parties are 
ranked according to the number of votes, and the logarithm of votes depends linearly on the rank 
of a party (the fit to a linear correlation is measured by the R², Figure 1c and SI Figure 5). 
Strikingly, the R² values observed in elections in Germany, the USA republican primaries , and 
France are almost always above 0.9. This log-linear structure is conserved over several years and 
over magnitudes of organizational units (cities, states, country). In Germany, even the 
demographic change and societal changes due to the German reunification did not apparently 
affect this data structure. The only case for which this linear relation is only weakly observed is 
the election in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. This election was the first one after the 
Second World War, and the elective system was different as each citizen has had only one vote, 
thereby possibly explaining the weak correlation.  
This structure in the data, namely the strong log-linear correlation between votes and the rank, is 
rather unexpected and is so far unexplained in the literature. When inspecting the log-linear 
relation over organizational units of different size (cities, states, country), we find the slope to be 
relatively similar and only the intercept depends on the size of the considered unit (table 1). 
Obviously, the mechanism creating this structure scales with the size of the population. This scale 
invariance in the population size is a strong requirement for the model we introduce next.  
Model overview and analytical results 
We consider a population of voters. Each voter supports a party, meaning he/she plans to vote for 
this party (see also SI, Figure 1). We aim to model the dynamics of the affiliation of voters to 
party and the time evolution of the number of parties. The dynamics is not based on political aims 
and competition of ideas, but driven by the word of mouth according to the following rules: a 
voter either just copies the opinion of another voter, or creates a new party.  At each time step, a 
randomly chosen person rethinks his/her opinion. This person may decide to keep his/her opinion 
with probability v, and if not there are two possibilities: 1) with a given small probability (1-v)u, 
he/she can found a new party, or 2) he/she selects randomly one individual in the population, and 
supports the party of that individual (with probability (1-v)(1-u)). When the last supporter of a 
party leaves, that party is eliminated. In this way we obtain a voter model that allows for the 
formation/destruction (or birth and death) of parties. We repeat the process until an equilibrium in 
the party structure is reached, that is when the number of parties reaches a stable value. This 
model is thus a birth and death process analogous to the well-known infinite allele Moran model 
in population genetics. The distribution of party size and number is described by the Ewens 
Sampling formula (25, 26).  
In our model, the equilibrium solution, i.e., the invariant measure of this stochastic process, is not 
directly the result obtained at the elections. We find that many parties with only very few 
supporters appear, and this situation is not realistic. Small groups are less likely to bear the effort 
required to be a party in country-wide elections, so that parties with a subcritical number of 
supporters would not stand for election. The relative critical size z  (minimal size 
possible/population size) is introduced as the last parameter of the model. As a consequence, the 
model behavior scales with the population size. 
As the infinite allele Moran model and the Ewens sampling formula are well understood, our 
analysis (see SI section 1 for an overview, and SI section 2 for the demonstrations) can be based 
on those results. In particular, we can condition on the number of parties that stand for election K 
(SI, sections 2.1 and 2.2). It turns out that the invariant measure is in this case determined by 
three parameters: the number of voters n , the running number of parties K , and the relative 
critical party size z . Moreover, it is straight forward to characterize the invariant measure of the 
model. Determine K identical and independent realizations  KXX ,...1  of random variables with  
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In order to address the log-linear structure, we order the realizations, ( ) ( ) ( )KXXX ≤≤≤ ...21 . We 
demonstrate that the model satisfies a variant of Zipf’s law, namely (SI, section 2.3) 
                              ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) dxz
x
xz
=XXE
z
z
i+i
n
1)ln(1
1 /1ln
/1ln11/lim
−Θ
→∞












−∫                       
where )/1ln(/ zK=Θ . Note that this expression parallels the classical Watterson estimator for the 
rescaled mutation rate Θ (28, Section 2.2]. The right hand side of the equation is independent of 
rank i. That is, the quotients of subsequent group sizes are constant in expectation. This 
observation is strongly related to the Zipf’s law; as without stochasticity, the logarithm depends 
linearly on the rank if and only if the quotient of subsequent groups is constant. If we consider the 
logarithm instead, we find no exact linear relation: 
( )( )( ) dx
z
xKjK
z
x
z
x
x
=nXE
jK
i
j
z
j
i
n






−−











−−−
−
−
=
−
→∞
∑ ∫ )/1ln(
)/1ln(
)/1ln(
)/1ln(
)/1ln(
)/1ln(11)ln(lnlim 10
1 1
.      
However, simulations indicate that the dependency of ( )( )( )iXE ln  is approximately linear with the 
rank i .  
In order to apply the model to data, we refine our assumptions. In elections the number of voters 
is known. We include this assumption in our model by conditioning the realizations KXX ,...,1  on 
the known total number of voters, n=X
K
j
j∑
=1
. As it is shown in SI, section 2.4, neither is the 
expected quotient of subsequent groups constant, nor does the expected logarithm of the group 
sizes depends linearly on the rank. Nevertheless, simulations indicate that the logarithmic data 
depend almost linearly on the rank. 
Results of the model fit to data 
We compare data of several elections with our model and find surprisingly a very good 
agreement (Figure 1a, b, and SI section 5 with data of elections and boxplots of 100 realizations 
of our model). Two parameters ( K , n ) can be readily read off the data. The third parameter, 
namely the relative critical party size, does only weakly depend on the number of parties/the 
number of voters (SI, section 3). For the investigation of the slope, we fix this parameter to 0.3 
per mille of the total number of voters. Particularly, it becomes of importance below that the 
slope of the log-linear relation is well met by the model over all elections in the FRG that we 
consider (Figure 1d).  Since the voter number only has a weak effect on the slope, and the relative 
minimal party size z is fixed, the slope is well predicted by the number of parties present in an 
election. We use model-based data analysis to infer more detailed information about voting 
behavior and the electoral system.  
Results and direct implications: the cannibalism effect 
We inspect the residuals of the linear model (Figure 2c), by plotting the data of different elections 
against the linear regression, using the 5% threshold as a reference point. We find that the 
number of voters for parties above the 5% threshold is systematically underestimated, while votes 
directly below the threshold are overestimated (Figure 2c). The voter numbers for small parties 
are basically met, even perhaps slightly underestimated (for very small parties).  
We suggest that this deviation from the correlation is due to strategic thinking by the voters. In 
fact, the voters who originally would want to vote for parties just below the threshold may expect 
that their vote would eventually not count (as the party would not be present in the parliament). 
Therefore, these voters change their mind and vote for a party above the threshold. The bigger 
parties thus cannibalize the slightly smaller ones. On the end of the distribution, the voters of 
very small parties may be driven by their political conviction only, and are not affected by the 
hypothetical presence of their party in the parliament. Though this systematic bias is doubtless 
present, and interesting in itself, it is only a second order effect that we do not address further 
here. 
Results and direct implications: number of parties in the parliament 
We can predict the slope s of the log-linear relation from the number of parties that stand for 
election K, and we know the total number of voters n . Consequently, we can compute the 
intercept a of the log-linear relation and are able to predict the expected outcome of the election. 
Approximately, the size of the i’th group ix satisfies 
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Namely, we can compute the number of parties that are present in the parliament as a result of the 
elective process (that is parties reaching the 5% threshold, { }05.0/|# >nxi i ). Recall that the 
slope of the log-linear regression mainly depends on the number of parties that stand for election, 
so that we can draw the expected number of parties in the parliament (Figure 2b).  
Our predictions can be compared with the election data (Figure 2a). We find a good agreement, 
with a tendency towards overestimation. This overestimation can be corrected by taking the 
cannibalism effect into account. The cannibalism effect increases the difficulty of a party to cross 
the 5% threshold, and consequently reduces the number of parties able to enter the parliament. 
The number of parties present in the parliament cannot grow to arbitrary high numbers, but we 
expect that at the present time we already reached this maximum in Germany. 
 Discussion 
We start this study by highlighting the statistical structure of electoral data in Germany but also 
recent elections in the USA (Republican primaries) and presidential elections in France when 
more than 10 parties or candidates are present. This motivates us to build a stochastic, 
mechanistic model that yields the observed structure of the log-linear regression between number 
of voters and rank of the party. The model has some intuitive ingredients, as the importance of 
the word-of-mouth in opinion dynamics.  
 In effect, each individual chooses initially a group, and the dynamics starts, i.e. voters can 
change their mind and move to another group or found a new one; groups vanish if the last 
member leaves. Groups can be parties or candidates (for the US and French elections). The 
groups do not exhibit in our model any specific characteristic (ideas, socio-economic policies, 
sociological identity,…), and therefore the moving from one group to another occurs at random 
(with a given probability). Our model is thus a “neutral” model of voter choice analogous to 
population genetics model of neutral alleles which frequency varies as a function of genetic drift 
in a population. The predictions of our model are in line with the statistical features of the data, 
and we identify the cannibalism effect that promotes large parties on the costs of smaller ones. 
Finally we provide a relation between the expected number of parties entering the parliament and 
the running number of parties.  
 
In recent years in the FRG, the large big-tent parties steadily loose votes, and more parties enter 
the parliament. In view of our analysis, we identify the reason for this effect as the steady 
increase of running and founded parties since approximately 1975 (Figure 2d). We suggest that 
the marginalization of big tent parties is the consequence of a long-term process, and not only a 
recent trend. The increase in the total number of parties is due to a fragmentation of the political 
spectrum into specialized parties, focusing on specific issues (e.g. environmental problems, 
women equality, elderly people place in the society, development of internet and information 
technology, promoting animal welfare,…). As these parties persist (often on a low level of votes, 
though), this yields the decrease in voters of large parties. Thus, the marginalization of big-tent 
parties is not necessarily based on a societal shift towards political extremes. 
We now interpret further the results of this study. On the first glance, our findings seem to 
contradict our understanding of elections, whereby rational and responsible citizens think about 
actual and future tasks and challenges of the society. Our model presents a voter as an individual 
primarily driven by social interactions and influenced mainly by the opinions of his/her 
neighborhood, and not by rational considerations about the direction the society should take in 
the next years. Models of this type (voter model, Sznajd model) have been proposed before. In 
these papers (see e.g. Gonzalez et al. (15)) local dynamics on a graph, where individuals interact 
with neighbors only were considered, also yielding the Zipf law. It is questionable whether in the 
current age of mass media and social networks these assumptions are realistic. Moreover, results 
from spatially structured data analysis indicate a simple logarithmic dependence of the 
correlation on the distance are in agreement with two-dimensional diffusion processes (6) which 
again hints that it is not the microscopic scale that drives the dynamics. A new aspect in the 
present study is the insight that the party (birth and death) dynamics and the truncation of small 
groups play a central role. This view doubtless capture one but not all important aspects in the 
dynamics of opinions. With the advent of social media, we predict that the word of mouth 
becomes important and generalized, and the opportunity for voters to change their mind (the 
probability v) becomes larger. The results of future elections and voter distributions can be 
studied using our model to test this hypothesis. Particularly, the birth/death process of parties is 
expected to accelerate. 
 In present times, democracy is criticized, and alternatives are proposed from an adaptation of the 
electoral process, e.g. by incorporation of random elements and chance (29), up to a fundamental 
change of democracy to epistocracy (30). Proponents of these ideas could be tempted, in order to 
support their point of view, to use our observation that elections have an inherited structure which 
is not in line with a rational decision process. However, we propose three other interpretations 
which could be more appropriate and fruitful.  
First, the ultimate decision process, and the shaping of governments and ruling majorities, takes 
place in the competition of large parties for voters. Most part of the data discussed here is 
concerned with smaller parties that only represent a relatively small part of the population (note 
that we take the logarithm of the voter numbers). This effect is best observed in the data of the 
presidential elections in France 2017 (see SI, section 4). Basically four candidates, representing 
drastically different political ideas, did compete and attracted fairly similar amount of votes.  
Nevertheless, when including all candidates’ results, the data show the log-linear structure 
discussed in the present paper. In the French presidential election, there is also a major 
cannibalism effect, because only the first two candidates qualify for the second round, which 
distorts the vote distribution as seen around the 5% threshold in the FRG results.  
Second, the model opens the door for problem driven decision processes. A central, new aspect in 
our model is the dynamics of party creation/destruction. This process is formulated in a neutral 
way, as parties are formed at a certain probability, and destroyed, if – by chance – the last 
supporter leaves. However, when inspecting the political aims of new parties, it appears often that 
their focus is driven by actual political issues. In other words, elections and the parliamentary 
system are crucially influenced by the question of whether new topics are handled adequately by 
big-tent parties. If not, the citizens may feel that new parties and movements are necessary to 
handle them. Our results indicate that new, even small, parties are able to influence the complete 
political landscape and are important for the distribution of votes.  
Third, our model cannot disentangle between two components of the switch probability v: 1) the 
decision of voters per se, or 2) the adequacy between voters’ need and party programs. In other 
words, our results can indicate some elements of randomness in the way that voters may switch 
their opinion and/or that parties change policies between elections. The feedback loop between 
voters need and priorities and parties’ policies being based upon a complex multi-factorial set of 
ideas filtered by rationale and irrational decisions (at the individual and at the party level), which 
may generate the neutral distribution observed in our results. This point of view is in agreement 
with e.g. (18). 
The aim of considerations as the present one is not a complete description of the democratic 
process, but the insight into some basic mechanisms acting in the system, such as the rationale or 
randomness of voters. We believe that our results reveal fundamental trends such as the steady 
increase of the number of political parties, and the cannibalism effect that influences the political 
geometry. The democratic system, which in essence should be based on equal opportunities and 
individuals’ participation to the society rather than only rely on elections, is here not questioned. 
Acknowledgment: We thank Faidra Stavropoulou for intensive discussions that did substantially 
improve the paper. 
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Table 
Table 1:  Unit of organization (city, state, or country), number of parties,number of active voters, 
and parameter of the fit of the linear model for the FRG election in the year 2013.  
 
unit #parties #voters intercept slope 2
adjR  
Stuttgart 20 284541 1.651 0.156 0.9438 
Munich 20 650216 1.933 0.165 0.9889 
Baden Wuerttemberg 20 5642019 2.953 0.156 0.9759 
Bavaria 20 6580755 3.009 0.161 0.9826 
Fed. Rep. Germany 30 43726856 3.146 0.121 0.9473 
 
 
Figure Legends 
Figure 1: Occurrence of the Zipf’s law in FRG election results and model fitting. (a)-(b) The 
logarithm of the number of voters over the rank of a party (data as filled circles) for 
organizational units of different size, together with a linear fit (solid line), indication of the 5% 
threshold (horizontal, dashed line) and results of 100 runs of the stochastic model (boxplot). 
Filled circles are for whole of FRG in (a) for the 2013 elections and (b) for 2017.  (c) R² for the 
linear fit of the data combined for cities (Munich, Stuttgart), regional states (Bavaria, Baden 
Württemberg), and FRG per election year. (d) The slope of the linear fit for the log-rank data 
over the number of parties, together with the model prediction (solid line). The data of the 
election in 1949 are indicated by +, the others by circles. 
 
 
Figure 2: Test of our model prediction and inference using all elections in FRG. (a), (b) number 
of parties in the parliament over number of parties in the election (solid lines for model 
prediction, circles for data) (c) Boxplot of residuals. Data are adapted such that the 5% threshold 
is always located between rank 28 and 29 (dashed vertical line). (d) Number of parties at the level 
of the FRG that obtained second votes per election.  
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Supplementary material: Mathematical analysis and data
Ho¨sel, Tellier, Mu¨ller
March 17, 2018
1 Overview over the mathematical analysis
1.1 Data driven modeling
We summarize the considerations made in the main text. The starting point of our considerations is
the observation that the number of votes per party satisfies approximately a log-linear dependency on
the party’s rank. The slope of this log-linear relation seems to be rather independent of the number
of voters: If we inspect the parameters of the linear model, we only find the intercept to vary with the
size of the group. The slope is fairly constant. That is, we expect that the mechanism is the same on
different levels of organization (city, state, country).
The decision process leads to group formation – we identify the voters of a given party with one group.
This process inherits, of course, stochasticity. That is, if we consider any partition of the population,
the resulting decomposition has a certain probability to meet the “true” decomposition, observed in
elections. As the data indicate that the slope is basically independent on the size of the organizational
unit, we expect that the fundamental ruling mechanisms are fairly independent of the population size
(number of voters). Even more, if we first take a subset of the complete population (the voters in
Bavaria, say), and the a subset of the subset (the voters in Munich), yields the same result as if we
directly take the small sample (Munich). In statistics, this property is known as sampling consistency
condition [7, 6]. The probability measures that exhibit the sampling consistency condition are well
characterized: they can be constructed by the so-called paint ball process [7]. One distribution out
of those is especially famous: the Ewens sampling distribution [4, 3]. This distribution has many
applications, in particular in population genetics [2], and moreover, can be generated by a stochastic
process – the infinite allele Moran model with mutations.
We adapt the infinite allele model in the context of opinion formation of voters (see Figure 1). Let us
consider a population of n voters – non-voters are neglected. Each voter is a supporter of a proto-party.
The difference between a party and a proto-party becomes clear below, by now we may identify the
two terms. Voters change their opinion in the following way: a randomly selected voter thinks over
his/her opinion. With a certain probability v, he/she stays with his/her opinion. With probability
1 − v the person is prepared to change the proto-party he/she is supporting. If this is the case, this
person either constitutes a new proto-party with probability u, or selects randomly one person of the
population and adopts the opinion of that individual. If the last supporting voter of a given proto-
party changes his/her mind such that this proto-party has no supporters any more, this proto-party is
dissolved. In particular, no political aims or believes are involved in this model – it is a model neutral.
In the long run, the stochastic process approaches its invariant measure. There is some kind of
equilibrium for the number of proto-parties (a distribution), and each individual is the follower of
a proto-party. In an election, however, proto-parties that are too small will not stand for election.
Only proto-parties with a supercritical number of followers become parties. It turns out later that
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in an election, parties that are too small are not present
probability (1−v)u
probability (1−v)(1−u)
probability v
???
???
the person joins a party
a new party is founded
a party is liquidated if the last supporter leaves
a randomly chosen person rethinks his/her opinion
Figure 1: Scheme of the model.
the relative critical size z = n0/n is even more handy parameter. Followers of a tiny proto-party give
their vote to another party, where a party is selected proportional to its size. We call this model the
voter model with party-dynamics.
The voter model with party dynamics and n0 = 0 is equivalent with an infinite-allele Moran model
with mutation. It is well known that the resulting composition structure follows the Ewens sampling
formula, which has only one parameter θ = 2un/(1− v), the rescaled party-constitution rate (or the
rescaled mutation rate in the context of population genetics). Our model has one additional parameter:
the threshold z ∈ (0, 1). All individuals in groups with a size smaller n0 = z n are distributed to the
groups with size larger or equal z n.
2 Invariant measure of the model, Ewens Sampling Formula and
Zipf’s law
2.1 The Ewens Sampling Formula
We recall some basic facts about the Ewens Sampling foprmula. The Ewens Sampling Formula is a
probability measure that describes partitions of a set (population) of size n. The Ewens Sampling
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Formula is appealing in that this probability measure is generated by the invariant measure of the
infinite allele model, that is, of a mechanistic and interpretable process. If z0 = 0, this process is
identical with our voter model with party dynamics.
Let us first consider the original Ewens Sampling Formula. In a sample of size n (given), we observe
K groups (K is a random variable). The sizes are given by a1, . . . , aK . Let c1 denote the number of
groups of size 1, c2 the number of groups of size 2, etc. The partition can be characterized by the
vector of frequencies C = (c1, . . . cn), where n =
∑n
i=1 i ci and K =
∑n
i=1 ci. The Ewens Sampling
Formula states the probability to observe a given partition structure C. Mostly, it is parametrized by
a scaled mutation probability θ, and can be formulated as (e.g. [3, page 22])
C ∼ (Y1, . . . Yn|
∑
iYi = n) (1)
where Yi ∼ Pois(θ/i) are independent Poisson random variables.
In our application it will be interesting to condition the distribution on the number of groups [3,
chapter 3.1], [10], [5, chapter 9.5]. Note that the number of groups K = K(C) =
∑
i ci is a random
variable. Then,
P (K = k|θ) = θ
k
θ(n)
|Skn| (2)
where Skn are the number of permutations of {1, . . . , n} with exactly k cycles. The Ewens Sampling
Formula reads (k =
∑
cj in the given realization)
P (C|θ) = n!
θ(n)
n∏
j=1
(θ/j)cj
cj !
=
n! θk
θ(n)
n∏
j=1
(1/j)cj
cj !
.
Therefore,
P (C|θ,K = k) = P (c1, . . . , cn and K = k|θ)
P (K = k|θ) =
P (c1, . . . , cn|θ)
P (K = k|θ) =
n!
|Skn|
n∏
j=1
(1/j)cj
cj !
.
In a slight abuse of notation, we define for ai ≥ 0,
∑
ai > 0
Multinom(n, (a1, . . . , am))
to denote the multinomial distribution with n trials, and pi = ai/
∑m
j=1 aj . If we compare the result
above with the probability function of a multinomial distribution, we conclude
(C|K = k) ∼ Multinom(k, (1, 1/2, . . . , 1/n))
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
ici = n. (3)
2.2 Invariant measure of the model
In our model we know the number of parties before the election takes place. That is, the natural
parametrization of our model uses the minimal group size possible n0 = bz nc, the population size n,
and the number of observed groups K+ (that is, groups with a supercritical size, ai ≥ bz nc). The aim
of the present section is to show that, conditioned on these parameters, the invariant measure of our
model can be well approximately by a multinomial distribution.
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In our case, we are only interested in groups with size above the critical group size n0. For the random
variable C = (c1, . . . , cn) define
K+ = K+(C) =
n∑
i=n0
ci, N+ = N+(C) =
n∑
i=n0
i ci, K− =
n0−1∑
i=1
ci = K−K+, N+ =
n0−1∑
i=1
i ci = n−N+.
Furthermore, we define the projections
Π+(c1, . . . , cn) = (0, . . . , 0, cn0 , . . . , cn), Π−(c1, . . . , cn) = (c1, . . . , cn0−1, 0 . . . , 0).
Our ultimate goal is an approximation of the distribution of Π+(C)|θ,K+. If we do not only condition
on K and K+, but also on N+, then
(Π+(C)|K = k, K+ = k+, N+ = n+) ∼ Multinom
(
k+, (0, . . . , 0, 1/n0, . . . , 1/n)
) ∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=n0
ici = n+.
Note that the r.h.s. does not depend on K any more. Thus, we may drop the condition on K,
(Π+(C)|K+ = k+, N+ = n+) ∼ Multinom
(
k+, (0, . . . , 0, 1/n0, . . . , 1/n)
) ∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=n0
ici = n+.
IfK+ = k+ is fixed, we have a hierarchical model: We obtain a conditioned multinomial distribution for
Π+(C)|θ, K+ = k+, N+ = n+, where θ does not appear directly any more; however, the distribution
of N+ depends on θ. That is, n+ can be considered as a hyperparameter with a given (θ-dependent)
distribution. In that, the situation is somewhat similar to that before: if we observe all groups, the
distribution of C|θ,K only depends on θ via the distribution of K. Also (3) can be interpreted as an
hierarchical model with hyperparameter K, which has the distribution indicated in (2).
In order to infer the distribution of N+, we note N+ = n−N−. Next we use (see [3, Theorem 1.19], [1])
that for n large, approximately ci ∼ Yi, where Yi ∼ Pois(θ/i) are independent random variables. Note
that in this step some heuristics are involved, as this theorem is only true for i fixed and n→∞. For
n large we have approximately
N− ∼
n0−1∑
i=1
Yi ∼ Pois(
n0−1∑
i=1
θ/i).
Note that this Poisson random variable may attend arbitrary large numbers, such that in this approx-
imation N+ ≤ n is not always given. However,
E(N−) ≈
n0−1∑
i=1
θ/i ≈ θ log(n0).
This argument indicates that the hyperparameter N+ can be represented as n−N−, where N− has a
Poisson distribution with expectation O(log(n)). Thus, for n large, N+ ≈ n, and we find in this sense
(Π+(C)|θ, K+ = k+, N+ = n) ≈ Multinom(k+, (0, . . . , 0, 1/n0, . . . , 1/n))
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=n0
ici = n+. (4)
This statistics can be reformulated in a handy way if the underlying urn model for a multinomial dis-
tribution is considered. We return to the group sizes (a1, . . . , ak+); recall that the sample configuration
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C = (cn0 , . . . , cn) is computed from a realization of (a1, . . . , ak+). We define i.i.d. random variables
X`, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k+}, with values in {n0, . . . , n} where
P (X` = i) = c/i, (5)
and, as before,
c−1 =
n∑
i=n0
i−1 ≈ ln((n0)/(n+ 1)) ≈ ln(1/z), (6)
then
(a1, . . . ak+)| N+ = n ∼ (X1, . . . , Xk+)
∣∣∣∣ k+∑
`=1
X` = n, (7)
The approximate distribution of configurations (Π+(C)|θ, K+ = k+, N+ = n) given in (4) is identical
with the distributions of configurations generated by (a1, . . . ak+) defined in (7). The invariant measure
of our dynamic model, the voter model with party dynamics, is well described by the construction (7).
There is a direct relation of this model to Zipf’s law: We draw a histogram of many realizations
(X1, . . . , Xk+) while pooling these random variables. For n and k+ large, n  k+, this histogram of
many realizations follows approximately the distribution of X`. The histogram follows a power law
(with exponent 1) in the relevant region between n0 and n, which is called Zipf’s law [9] in the present
context.
However, we are not interested in the structure of many realizations, but in that of one realization
(X1, . . . , Xk+). We claim, that also for one realization (with n  k+, n  n0, and k+ large) we find
again a power law (with different exponent) for the rank data. We approach this question in the next
sections.
2.3 Rank statistics – unconditioned case
In this section, we derive an expression for the expectation of the size ratio of subsequent groups
(ordered according to their rank), respectively about the expectation of the logarithm of the group
size. Here we do not condition on the total population size. That is, we consider K independent
realizations X1, . . . , XK of i.i.d. random variables that assume values in {n0, . . . , n}, where 0 < n0 < n,
P (Xi = j) = c/j for j ∈ {n0, . . . , n} and 0 else, c−1 =
∑n
j=n0
j−1. We order these realizations
according to size X(1) ≤ X(2) . . . ≤ X(K), and investigate E(X(`+1)/X(`)) respectively E(ln(X(`+1))).
The central result of this section is the independence of that expectation w.r.t. ` for n large:
Theorem 2.1 Let θ = K/ ln(1/z). For ` ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} we find
lim
n→∞E(X(`+1)/X(`)) = G(θ, z) := 1 + θ
∫ 1
z
(
1
z
− 1
y
) (
ln(1/y)
ln(1/z)
)ln(1/z) θ−1
dy. (8)
That is, the expectation of the quotient of subsequent group sizes is constant in the rank. The next
proposition indicates that E(X(`+1)/X(`)) only depends weakly on z (for z small) if θ is larger one
and kept fixed.
Proposition 2.2 We find for θ > 1 that
lim
z→0
G(θ, z) =
θ
θ − 1 . (9)
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For the logarithm, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3 For ` = 1, · · · ,K, we find
lim
n→∞ E(ln(X(`+1))− log(n))
= −
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
) ∫ 1
z
1
x
(
1− ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)j−1 ( ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)K−j (
K − j −K ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)
dx. (10)
This theorem indicates that the logarithm of the population size does not exactly depends in a linear
way on the rank `, but only approximatively.
We prove the theorems resp. proposition in the next sections.
2.3.1 Order statistics
As a first step we obtain P (X(`) = i), based on the well known formulas for the distribution functions
of order statistics.
In the following, we use the convention that a sum extending from a to b with a > b is zero, in
particular
n∑
i=n+1
(· · · ) := 0.
Proposition 2.4
P (X(1) = i1) =
 n∑
j=i1
c
j
K −
 n∑
j=i1+1
c
j
K
P (X(`) = i1) =
cK
i1
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
){( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j−1 ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j−1 [
K
(
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)
− jc−1
]}
+O(i−21 ).
Proof: Since P (X` ≥ i1) =
∑n
i=i1
c/i for ` = 1, . . . ,K, we have P (X(1) ≥ i1) =
(∑n
j=i1
c
j
)K
and
P (X(1) = i1) = P (X(1) ≥ i1)− P (X(1) ≥ i1 + 1) =
 n∑
j=i1
c
j
K −
 n∑
j=i1+1
c
j
K
Furthermore, we find for the `’th order statistics X(`)
P (X(`) ≥ i) = P (at most `− 1 realizations are smaller i)
=
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
P (X1 < i)
j P (X1 ≥ i)K−j = cK
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)( i−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j ( n∑
m=i
1
m
)K−j
.
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Hence, by means of Taylor expansion we obtain
P (X(`) = i1) = P (X(`) ≥ i1)− P (X(`) ≥ i1 + 1)
= cK
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
(
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j ( n∑
m=i1
1
m
)K−j
−
(
i1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j
= cK
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
){( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
+
1
i1
)K−j
−
(
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
+
1
i1
)j ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j }
= cK
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
){( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j [( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j
+
K − j
i1
(
n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j−1 ]
−
[( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j
+
j
i1
(
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j−1 ] ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j }
+O(i−21 )
=
cK
i1
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
){( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j−1 ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j−1
×
[
(K − j)
(
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)
− j
(
n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)]}
+O(i−21 )
=
cK
i1
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
){( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j−1 ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j−1 [
K
(
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)
− jc−1
]}
+O(i−21 )

Therewith, we find
E(X(1)) =
n∑
i=n0
i

 n∑
j=i
c
j
K −
 n∑
j=i+1
c
j
K

=
 n∑
i=n0
i
 n∑
j=i
c
j
K
−
 n∑
i=n0
(i+ 1)
 n∑
j=i+1
c
j
K
+
 n∑
i=n0
 n∑
j=i+1
c
j
K

= n0 +
 n∑
i=n0
 n∑
j=i+1
c
j
K
 (11)
where we used that
∑n
j=n0
c/j = 1 and
∑n
j=n+1(. . .) = 0.
Let us introduce some more notation. Denote by X(`);n0,n,K the random variable as introduced above;
the additional indices characterize all parameters of the random variable.
If we condition on X(1) = i1, then X(2), . . . , X(K) is the order statistics of K−1 random variables with
values in i1, . . . , n. That is, we obtain realizations X(2), . . . , X(K) by determining K − 1 realizations
of random variables Yi with values in i1, . . . , n, where P (Yi = j) = c˜i1,n/j. Here, as before, c˜
−1
i1,n
=∑n
j=i1
j−1. Then,
(X(2), . . . , X(K))|X(1) = i1 ∼ (Y(1), . . . , Y(K−1)).
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In particular,
X(2);n0,n,K |X(1);n0,n,K = i1 ∼ X(1);i1,n,K−1
and, similarly, for ` = 1, . . . ,K − 1,
X(`+1);n0,n,K |X(`);n0,n,K = i1 ∼ X(1);i1,n,K−` (12)
2.3.2 Size ratio
Before we come to the point where we investigate limn→nE(X(`+1)/X(`)), we first indicate two alge-
braic relations. All computations below are not deep, but lengthy and involving.
Proposition 2.5
`−1∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
`− 1−m
)(
`− (`− 1−m)− 1
m
)
K =
1
(`− 1)!
`−1∏
j=0
(K − j).
Proof: First we note that
1
(`− 1)!
`−1∏
j=0
(K − j) = K!
(`− 1)!(K − `)! =
K!
(`− 1)!(K − 1− (`− 1))! = K
(
K − 1
`− 1
)
Then,
`−1∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
`− 1−m
)(
`− (`− 1−m)− 1
m
)
K
= K
`−1∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
`− 1−m
)
= K
`−2∑
m=0
(−1)m
[(
K − 1
`− 1−m− 1
)
+
(
K − 1
`− 1−m
)]
+ (−1)`−1
(
K
0
)
K
= K
[(
K − 1
`− 2
)
+
(
K − 1
`− 1
)]
+K
`−1∑
m=2
(−1)m+1
(
K − 1
`− 1−m
)
+K
`−2∑
m=1
(−1)m
(
K − 1
`− 1−m
)
+ (−1)`−1 K
= K
[(
K − 1
`− 2
)
+
(
K − 1
`− 1
)]
+K(−1)`
(
K − 1
0
)
−K
(
K − 1
`− 2
)
+ (−1)`−1 K = K
(
K − 1
`− 1
)

Proposition 2.6 For n ∈ {0, . . . , `− 2},
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
{(
K
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
K −
(
K
n+ 1−m
)
(n+ 1−m)
(
`− (n+ 1−m)− 1
m
)}
= 0
Proof: With (
K
n+ 1−m
)
(n+ 1−m) =
(
K − 1
n+ 1−m
)
K
8
we find
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n−m
)
K
(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
−
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n+ 1−m
)
(n+ 1−m)
(
`− (n+ 1−m)− 1
m
)
= K
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
{(
K
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
−
(
K − 1
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 2
m
)}
= K
n∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K
m
)(
`−m− 1
n−m
)
−
(
K − 1
m
)(
`−m− 2
n−m
)}
= K(−1)n
(
`− 1
n
)
+K
n∑
m=1
(−1)n−m
{(
K
m
)(
`−m− 1
n−m
)}
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m
)(
`−m− 2
n−m
)}
−K
(
K − 1
n
)
= K(−1)n
(
`− 1
n
)
−K
n−1∑
m′=0
(−1)n−m′
{(
K
m′ + 1
)(
`−m′ − 2
n−m′ − 1
)}
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m
)(
`−m− 2
n−m
)}
−K
(
K − 1
n
)
= K(−1)n
(
`− 1
n
)
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{
(
(
K − 1
m+ 1
)
+
(
K − 1
m
)
)
(
`−m− 2
n−m− 1
)}
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m
)(
`−m− 2
n−m
)}
−K
(
K − 1
n
)
= K(−1)n
(
`− 1
n
)
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m+ 1
)(
`−m− 2
n−m− 1
)}
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m
)
(
(
`−m− 2
n−m
)
+
(
`−m− 2
n−m− 1
)}
−K
(
K − 1
n
)
= K(−1)n
(
`− 1
n
)
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m+ 1
)(
`− (m+ 1)− 1
n− (m+ 1)
)}
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m
)(
`−m− 1
n−m
)}
−K
(
K − 1
n
)
= K(−1)n
(
`− 1
n
)
+K
n∑
m=1
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m
)(
`−m− 1
n−m
)}
−K
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)n−m
{(
K − 1
m
)(
`−m− 1
n−m
)}
−K
(
K − 1
n
)
= 0.

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Proposition 2.7
lim
n→∞E(X(`+1)/X(`))− 1
=
1
(`− 1)!
`−1∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)`−1 ln(1/z)−`
v2
dv du (13)
Proof: As X(`+1);n0,n,K |X(`);n0,n,K = i1 ∼ X(1);i1,n,K−`, we have (ci,n := (
∑n
h=i h
−1)−1)
E(X(`+1)/X(`)) = E(E(X(`+1)/X(`)|X(`))) =
n∑
i1=n0
1
i1
E(X(`+1)|X(`) = i1)P (X(`) = i1)
=
n∑
i1=n0
1
i1
E(X(1);i1,n,K−`) P (X(`) = i1)
=
n∑
i1=n0
1
i1
i1 +
 n∑
i=i1
 n∑
j=i+1
ci1,n
j
K−`

P (X(`) = i1)
= 1 +
n∑
i1=n0
1
i1
 n∑
i=i1
 n∑
j=i+1
ci1,n
j
K−`
P (X(`) = i1).
Hence,
E(X(`+1)/X(`))− 1
=
`−1∑
j=0
n∑
i1=n0
n∑
i=i1
cK
(i1/n)2
 n∑
j′=i+1
ci1,n
j′
K−` [(K
j
){( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j−1 ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j−1
×
×
(
K
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
− jc−1
)
+
1
n
O((i1/n)−3)
]
1
n2
.
Introducing y = i/n ∈ [ln(1/z)−1, 1], w = i1/n ∈ [y, 1], we find for n large
n∑
j′=i+1
ci1,n
j′
=
ln((n+ 1)/i)
ln((n+ 1)/i1)
+O(i−11 ) =
ln(1/y)
ln(1/w)
+O(n−1)
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
= ln((i1 − 1)/n0) +O(i−11 ) = ln
(
(i1 − 1)/n)
(n0/n)
)
+O(i−11 ) = ln(w/z) +O(n−1)
n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
= ln(n/(i1 + 1)) +O(i−11 ) = ln(1/w) +O(n−1)
As n0 = bz nc, we note furthermore that limn→∞ c−1 = limn→∞ ln(n/n0) = ln(1/z). In the equation
E(X(`+1)/X(`)) − 1 we recognize two nested Riemann sums; for n → ∞, we find that these terms
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converge to nested integrals
lim
n→∞E(X(`+1)/X(`))− 1
=
`−1∑
j=0
∫ 1
z
∫ 1
w
ln(1/z)−K
w2
(
ln(1/y)
ln(1/w)
)K−` (K
j
)
ln(w/z)j−1 ln(1/w)K−j−1
(
K ln(w/z)− j ln(1/z)
)
dy dw
=
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K ln(1/z)−K
∫ 1
z
ln(1/y)K−`
∫ y
z
1
w2
ln(w/z)j ln(1/w)K−j−1
ln(1/w)K−`
dw dy
−
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
j ln(1/z)−K+1
∫ 1
z
ln(1/y)K−`
∫ y
z
1
w2
ln(w/z)j−1 ln(1/w)K−j−1
ln(1/w)K−`
dw dy
=
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K ln(1/z)−K
∫ 1
z
ln(1/y)K−`
∫ y
z
1
w2
ln(w/z)j ln(1/w)`−j−1 dw dy
−
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
j ln(1/z)−K+1
∫ 1
z
ln(1/y)K−`
∫ y
z
1
w2
ln(w/z)j−1 ln(1/w)`−j−1 dw dy
Now we transform the integrals: Let y = z(u+ 1), then
E(X(`+1)/X(`))
= 1 +
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K ln(1/z)−K
∫ 1/z−1
0
ln
(
1
z(u+ 1)
)K−`
z
∫ z(1+u)
z
1
w2
ln(w/z)j ln(1/w)`−j−1 dw du
−
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
j ln(1/z)−K+1
∫ 1/z−1
0
ln
(
1
z(u+ 1)
)K−`
z
∫ z(1+u)
z
1
w2
ln(w/z)j−1 ln(1/w)`−j−1 dw du.
And next, let v = w/z,
E(X(`+1)/X(`))
= 1 +
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K ln(1/z)−K
∫ 1/z−1
0
ln
(
1
z(u+ 1)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
ln(v)j ln(1/(z v))`−j−1 dv du
−
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
j ln(1/z)−K+1
∫ 1/z−1
0
ln
(
1
z(u+ 1)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
ln(v)j−1 ln(1/(z v))`−j−1 dv du
= 1 +
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K ln(1/z)−`
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
ln(v)j ln(1/(z v))`−j−1 dv du
−
`−1∑
j=1
(
K
j
)
j ln(1/z)−`+1
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
ln(v)j−1 ln(1/(z v))`−j−1 dv du.
We expand ln(1/(zv))`−j−1 = [− ln(v) + ln(1/z)]`−j−1, and collect terms with equal powers of ln(v)
and ln(1/z): If we use the abbreviation
A =
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)
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we have
E(X(`+1)/X(`))− 1
=
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K ln(1/z)−`
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
ln(v)j ln(1/(z v))`−j−1 dv du
−
`−1∑
j=1
(
K
j
)
j ln(1/z)−`+1
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
ln(v)j−1 ln(1/(z v))`−j−1 dv du
=
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K ln(1/z)−` ×
×
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
(
`−j−1∑
m=0
(
`− j − 1
m
)
(−1)m ln(v)m ln(1/z)`−j−1−m
)
ln(v)j dv du
−
`−1∑
j=1
(
K
j
)
j ln(1/z)−`+1 ×
×
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
(
`−j−1∑
m=0
(
`− j − 1
m
)
(−1)m ln(v)m ln(1/z)`−j−1−m
)
ln(v)j−1 dv du
=
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
K
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
(
`−j−1∑
m=0
(
`− j − 1
m
)
(−1)m ln(v)m+j ln(1/z)−j−1−m
)
dv du
−
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
)
j
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
(
`−j−1∑
m=0
(
`− j − 1
m
)
(−1)m ln(v)m+j−1 ln(1/z)−j−m
)
dv du
By n = m+ j, we re-order the sums, noting that
`−1∑
j=0
`−j−1∑
m=0
term(j,m) =
`−1∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
term(n−m,m)
Therwith,
E(X(`+1)/X(`))− 1
=
`−1∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
K
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)n ln(1/z)−n−1
v2
dv du
−
`−1∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
(n−m)
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)n−1 ln(1/z)−n
v2
dv du
=
`−1∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
`− 1−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
K
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)`−1 ln(1/z)−`
v2
dv du
+
`−2∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
K
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)n ln(1/z)−n−1
v2
dv du
−
`−1∑
n=1
n−1∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
(n−m)
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)n−1 ln(1/z)−n
v2
dv du
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=`−1∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
`− 1−m
)(
`− (`− 1−m)− 1
m
)
K
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)`−1 ln(1/z)−`
v2
dv du
+
`−2∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n−m
)(
`− (n−m)− 1
m
)
K
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)n ln(1/z)−n−1
v2
dv du
−
`−2∑
n=0
n∑
m=0
(−1)m
(
K
n+ 1−m
)(
`− (n+ 1−m)− 1
m
)
(n+ 1−m)
∫ 1/z−1
0
AK−`
∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)n ln(1/z)−n−1
v2
dv du
With propositions 2.5 and 2.6 the result follows.

Now we are in the position to prove theorem 2.1.
Proof: [of Theorem 2.1] We start off with
E(X(`+1)/X(`))− 1
=
1
(`− 1)!
`−1∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)`−1 ln(1/z)−`
v2
dv du
=
ln(1/z)−`
(`− 1)!
`−1∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)`−1
v2
dv du
If we focus on the inner integral, we find (ν = ln(v), dν = 1vdv, v = e
ν)∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)`−1
v2
dv =
∫ ln(1+u)
0
ν`−1 e−ν dν = γ(`, ln(1 + u))
where γ(n, x) denotes the (lower) incomplete Γ function. In particular, γ(n, x) = (n− 1) γ(n− 1, x)−
xn−1 e−x. Thus, for ` ≥ 2,
E(X(`+1)/X(`))− 1
=
ln(1/z)−`
(`− 1)!
`−1∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−` ∫ 1+u
1
ln(v)`−1
v2
dv du
=
ln(1/z)−`
(`− 1)!
`−1∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
γ(`, ln(1 + u))
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−`
du
= − ln(1/z)
−`+1
(`− 1)!
`−2∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
γ(`, ln(1 + u)) (1 + u)
d
du
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−(`−1)
du
=
ln(1/z)−`+1
(`− 1)!
`−2∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
γ(`, ln(1 + u)) +
ln(1 + u)`−1(1 + u)
(1 + u)2
)(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−(`−1)
du
=
ln(1/z)−`+1
(`− 1)!
`−2∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
(`− 1)γ(`− 1, ln(1 + u))
)(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−(`−1)
du
=
ln(1/z)−(`−1)
(`− 2)!
`−2∏
j=0
(K − j)
∫ 1/z−1
0
γ(`− 1, ln(1 + u))
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−(`−1)
du
= E(X(`)/X(`−1))− 1.
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Per finite induction we find that E(X(`)/X(`−1)) is independent off ` (for those ` that are feasible). If
we take ` = 1, we have (y = z(1 + u), θ = K/ ln(1/z))
E(X(2)/X(1)) = 1 +
K
ln(1/z)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1− ln(u+ 1)
ln(1/z)
)K−1 ∫ 1+u
1
1
v2
dv du
= 1 +
K
ln(1/z)
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1
z
− 1
z(1 + u)
) (
ln(1/(z(1 + u)))
ln(1/z)
)K−1
z du
= 1 + θ
∫ 1
z
(
1
z
− 1
y
) (
ln(1/y)
ln(1/z)
)θ ln(1/z)−1
dy = G(θ, z).

2.3.3 Limit z → 0
We expect this expression mainly to depend on θ = K/ ln(1/z). That is, our formula reads
E(X(`+1)/X(`)) = G(θ, z) = 1 + θ
∫ 1
z
(
1
z
− 1
y
) (
ln(1/y)
ln(1/z)
)ln(1/z) θ−1
dy
In order to discuss the dependencies of G(θ, z), we keep θ fixed and take the limit z → 0.
Proposition 2.8
lim
z→0
G(θ, z) =
θ
θ − 1 (14)
Proof: We use the transformation y = z(1 + u), and w = ln(1 + u), and introduce x = ln(1/z):
lim
z→0
∫ 1
z
(
1
z
− 1
y
) (
ln(1/y)
ln(1/z)
)ln(1/z) θ−1
dy
= lim
z→0
∫ 1/z−1
0
(
1
z
− 1
z(1 + u)
) (
ln(1/(z(1 + u)))
ln(1/z)
)ln(1/z) θ−1
z du
= lim
z→0
∫ 1/z−1
0
u
1 + u
(
1− ln(1 + u)
ln(1/z)
)ln(1/z) θ−1
du
= lim
x→∞
∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ−1
dw
In order to compute this limit, we first note that ζ(u) = ln(1 − u) + u/(1 − u) has the derivative
ζ ′(u) = u/(1 − u)2 ≥ 0 for u ∈ [0, 1); since ζ(0) = 0, we have ζ(u) ≥ 0 for u ∈ [0, 1). Since
d
dx(1 − w/x)x = (1 − w/x)x ζ(w/x) ≥ 0, we have 0 ≤ (1 − w/x)x ≤ e−w, and (1 − w/x)x tends in a
monotonously increasing way to e−w.
Next we note (recall that θ > 1)
lim sup
x→∞
∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ
dw ≤ lim sup
x→∞
∫ x
0
(ew − 1) e−θ w dw =
∫ ∞
0
(ew − 1) e−θ w dw <∞.
Furthermore, for any x0 ∈ R, we find
lim inf
x→∞
∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ
dw ≥ lim inf
x→∞
∫ x0
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ
dw =
∫ x0
0
(ew − 1) e−θw dw.
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Figure 2: Convergence of G(θ, z) (solid line) to G(θ, 0) (dashed line) for θ = 1.5. Note the logarithmic
scale of the x-axis.
As
∫ x0
0 (e
w − 1) e−θw dw → ∫∞0 (ew − 1) e−θw dw for x0 → ∞, we conclude that∫ x
0 (e
w − 1) (1− wx )x θ dw converges to ∫∞0 (ew − 1) e−θw dw.
Last, we consider the limiting behaviour of∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ (
1− w
x
)−1
dw =
∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x (θ−ε) (
1− w
x
)ε x−1
dw.
Let ε > 0, s.t. θ − ε > 1. For x large enough, ε x − 1 > 0 and (1− wx )ε x−1 < 1. With the argument
from above,
lim sup
x→∞
∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ (
1− w
x
)−1
dw ≤
∫ ∞
0
(ew − 1) e−(θ−ε)w dw.
Since this inequality holds true for any ε > 0, we can take ε = 0. The estimate for lim inf from below
relies on the same argument as before: for x0 ∈ R fixed we have
lim inf
x→∞
∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ (
1− w
x
)−1
dw
≥ lim inf
x→∞
∫ x0
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ (
1− w
x
)−1
dw =
∫ x0
0
(ew − 1) e−θ w dw.
Hence,
lim
x→∞
∫ x
0
(ew − 1)
(
1− w
x
)x θ−1
dw =
∫ ∞
0
(ew − 1) e−θw dw = 1
θ − 1 −
1
θ
.

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For n 1 and z  1 and θ = K/ ln(1/z), we have
E(X(`+1)/X(`)) ≈
θ
θ − 1 (15)
From this result, we conclude that E(X(`+1)/X(`)) mainly depends on θ = K/ ln(1/z); however, the
convergence of G(θ, z) to G(θ, 0) is rather slow (see figure 2). If we parametrize the model with the
rescaled “party creation rate” θ and the relative minimal party size z, the model is sensitive in θ and
insensitive in z. It is only necessary to know the rough magnitude of z as long as we know θ precisely.
2.3.4 Logarithm of the group sizes
Proof: [of theorem 2.3] Using proposition 2.4, we find
lim
n→∞E(ln(X(1))− ln(n)) = limn→∞
n∑
i=n0
ln(i/n)P (X(1) = i)
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=n0
ln(i/n)

 n∑
j=i
c
j
K −
 n∑
j=i+1
c
j
K
 = limn→∞
n∑
i=n0
ln(i/n)

 n∑
j=i
c
j
K −
 n∑
j=i
c
j
− c
i
K
 .
Note that
∑n
j=i
c
j = O(n0). Taylor expansion yields
lim
n→∞E(ln(X(1))− ln(n)) = limn→∞
n∑
i=n0
ln(i/n)
K ci
 n∑
j=i
c
j
K−1 +O(i−2)

= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=n0
ln(i/n)
K c
K
i/n
 n∑
j=i
1
j/n
1
n
K−1 +O((i/n)−2) 1
n
 1n
We recognize two nested Riemann sums, that converge to the corresponding integrals. If we use that
c converges to 1/ ln(1/z) for n→∞, we obtain
lim
n→∞E(ln(X(1))− ln(n)) = K ln(1/z)
−K
∫ 1
z
ln(x)
x
(∫ 1
x
1
y
dy
)K−1
dx = −K
∫ 1
z
1
x
(
ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)K
dy.
For ` > 1, E(ln(X`)) is handled in a similar way:
lim
n→∞E(ln(X(`))− ln(n)) =
n∑
i=n0
ln(i/n)P (X(`) = i)
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=n0
{
ln(i/n)
cK
i1
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
){( i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)j−1 ( n∑
m=i1+1
1
m
)K−j−1 [
K
(
i1−1∑
w=n0
1
w
)
− jc−1
]}
+O(i−21 )
}
= −
`−1∑
j=0
(
K
j
) ∫ 1
z
1
x
(
1− ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)j−1 ( ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)K−j (
K − j −K ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)
dx.

Note that E(log(X(`+1)))−E(log(X(`))) is not independent on `, even for n large; the expectation of
log(X(`)) does not depend exactly in a linear way on the rank `, but only approximately. The growth
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law of the group sizes can be better seen in the rations of subsequent groups than in the logarithm of
group sizes. However, for practical purpose, the difference of the linear growth law for the logarithmic
group sizes (Zipf’s law) is negligible.
As as heuristic estimator for z we will use
E(ln(X(1))− ln(n) = −K
∫ 1
z
1
x
(
ln(1/x)
ln(1/z)
)K
dy.
We replace E(X(1)) by the minimal observed group size, and infer from the relation above the pa-
rameter z. Though we consider data that are conditioned on the total population (number of voters
known), for practical purposes this estimator works fine (see figures sin section 5).
2.4 Rank statistics – conditioned case
Now we investigate the corresponding order statistics in the conditioned case: We consider K inde-
pendent realizations X1, . . . , XK of i.i.d. RV that assume values in {n0, . . . , n}, where 0 < n0 < n,
P (Xi = j) = c/j for j ∈ {n0, . . . , n} and 0 else, where c−1 =
∑n
j=n0
j−1. We condition on
∑K
i=1Xi = n
and order these realizations according to size X(1) ≤ X(2) . . . ≤ X(K). In order to distinguish the con-
ditioned and the non-conditioned random variables, let us denote the realizations with condition by
X(1),n ≤ X(2),n . . . ≤ X(K),n.
The objects to investigate are E(X(`+1),n/X(`),n) and E(ln(X(`),n)).
2.4.1 Joint distribution
Proposition 2.9 Let
MK =
{
(i1, . . . iK) |n0 ≤ i1 ≤ n/K, iK = n−
K∑
`=1
i`,
ij−1 ≤ ij ≤ 1
K − j + 1
(
n−
j−1∑
`=1
i`
)
, j = 2, . . .K − 1
}
and
cK ≈
(∫ 1/K
z
∫ (1−x1)/(K−1)
x1
∫ (1−x1−x2)/(K−2)
x2
· · ·
∫ (1−∑K−2j=1 xj)/2
xK−1
1
1−∑K−1`=1 x`
K−1∏
`=1
1
x`
dxK−1 · · · dx1
)−1
.
Then, for (i1, . . . , iK) ∈MK , we have
P (X(1),n = i1, . . . , X(K),n = iK) = cK
K∏
`=1
1
i`
+O(n−1).
Proof: The values that (X(1),n ≤ X(2),n . . . ≤ X(K),n) can assume is given by (i1, . . . iK) ∈MK with
Mk = {(i1, . . . iK) |n0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 . . . ≤ iK ,
K∑
`=1
i` = n}.
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In order to obtain a conditioned realization, we may draw unconditioned realizations until the condition
is hit, and only accept those. Hence, the probability for an admissible value is proportional to the
unconditioned probability distribution:
P (X(1),n = i1, . . . X(K),n = iK) = C
K∏
`=1
1
i`
;
The constant C can be determined by
C−1 =
∑
(i1,...iK)∈MK
K∏
`=1
1
i`
.
We characterize MK better. For (i1, . . . iK) ∈MK , we mey write
iK = n−
K−1∑
`=1
i`.
Thus,
iK−1 ≤ iK = n−
K−1∑
`=1
i` ⇒ iK−1 ≤ 1
2
(
n−
K−2∑
`=1
i`
)
.
We can proceed recursively,
iK−2 ≤ iK−1 ≤ 1
2
(
n−
K−2∑
`=1
i`
)
⇒ iK−2 ≤ iK−1 ≤ 1
3
(
n−
K−3∑
`=1
i`
)
· · · iK−j−1 ≤ iK−j ≤ 1
j + 1
(
n−
K−j−1∑
`=1
i`
)
or
ij−1 ≤ ij ≤ 1
K − j + 1
(
n−
j−1∑
`=1
i`
)
For i1, we obtain the maximal value given if all indices are equal, i1 ≤ n/K. Hence,
MK =
{
(i1, . . . iK) |n0 ≤ i1 ≤ n/K, iK = n−
K∑
`=1
i`,
ij−1≤ij ≤ 1
K − j + 1
(
n−
j−1∑
`=1
i`
)
, j = 2, . . .K − 1
}
.
Therewith,
C−1 =
∑
(i1,...iK)∈MK
1
1−∑K−1`=1 i`/n
K−1∏
`=1
1
i`/n
n−K
≈ n−1
∫ 1/K
z
∫ (1−x1)/(K−1)
x1
∫ (1−x1−x2)/(K−2)
x2
· · ·
∫ (1−∑K−2j=1 xj)/2
xK−1
1
1−∑K−1`=1 x`
K−1∏
`=1
1
x`
dxK−1 · · · dx1
=: (cK n)
−1.
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
For symmetry reasons, we may write as well
c−1K =
1
K!
∫ 1−(K−1)z0
z0
· · ·
∫ 1−(K−1)z0
z0
1
1−∑K−1`=1 x`
K−1∏
`=1
1
x`
dxxK−1 · · · dx1.
Note that (X1, .., XK)/n follows for n→∞ a truncated Dirichlet distribution with parameters αi = 0;
while for the original Dirichlet distribution necessarily αi > 0 due to integrability conditions, the
truncated Dirichet distribution is also well defined for αi = 0.
2.4.2 Size ratio
We do not compute the expectation of the quotient for general K but only for K = 3. As discussed
above, the joint distribution of (X(1), X(2)) is given by
P (X(1) = i1, X(2) = i2) =
c3
i1 i2(n− i1 − i2)
respectively
P (X(2) = i2, X(3) = i3) = c3
1
(n− i2 − i3) i2 i3
where
c−13 =
2
3!
∫ 1−2z
z
1
x(1− x) ln
(
1− z − x
z
)
dx.
Therewith,
c3 lim
n→∞E(X(2)/X(1)) =
∫ 1/3
z0
∫ (1−x)/2
x
1
x2 (1− x− y) dy dx =
∫ 1/3
z0
x−2 ln
(
2(1− 2x)
(1− x)
)
dx.
Furthermore,
c3 lim
n→∞E(X(3)/X(2)) =
∫ 1/3
z0
∫ (1−x)/2
x
1
x y2
dy dx = 2 ln(2)− 1 + 1
z0
− 2 ln(1/z0 − 1).
Obviously,
lim
n→∞E(X(2)/X(1)) 6= limn→∞E(X(3)/X(2)).
The magnitude of both expectation are in the same range, though (see figure 3).
2.4.3 Logarithm of group sizes
Theorem 2.10 For k < K,
E(ln(X(k),n))− ln(n)
= cK
∫ 1/K
z
∫ (1−x1)/(K−1)
x1
∫ (1−x1−x2)/(K−2)
x2
· · ·
∫ (1−∑K−2j=1 xj)/2
xK−1
ln(xk)
1−∑K−1`=1 x`
K−1∏
`=1
1
x`
dxK−1 · · · dx1
and
E(ln(X(K)))− ln(n)
= cK
∫ 1/K
z
∫ (1−x1)/(K−1)
x1
∫ (1−x1−x2)/(K−2)
x2
· · ·
∫ (1−∑K−2j=1 xj)/2
xK−1
ln
(
1−∑K−1`=1 x`)
1−∑K−1`=1 x`
K−1∏
`=1
1
x`
dxK−1 · · · dx1.
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Figure 3: E(X(2)/X(1)) (solid line) and E(X(3)/X(2)) (dashed line) for K = 3.
The proof consists of an obvious calculation. Particularly, for n large, E(ln(X(`),n)) = ln(n) plus a
term only depending on z, `, K, but not on n.
Though we see that, strictly spoken, there is no linear relation between the logarithmic size of groups
and their order, simulations indicate that the dependency is almost linear, even if K is small (see
figure 4).
2.4.4 Simulations
Direct simulations of X(k),n/n in a naive way is costly for large n. The convergence of X(k),n/n to
the truncated Dirichlet distribution opens the way for a simple method to construct realizations. We
fix a population size of nˆ = 105+m, where m ∈ N0 is the minimal non-negative integer to ensure that
z nˆ > 5. Then, we draw K independent realizations of Xk as introduced in section 2.3. We accept a
realization if
∑K
i=1Xk ∈ [0.95 nˆ, 1.05 nˆ]. In order to obtain (approximate) realizations for population
size n, we rescale nXk/nˆ. This algorithm is able to handle the populations sizes at hand for the data
we consider.
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3 Visualization of Data
3.1 Data sources
The data for the election of the FRG (“Bundestagswahl”) can be downloaded from
https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundeswahlleiter.html
We only take parties into account that can be vote for by second votes (“Zweitstimmen”).
The data for the elections in France can be found in
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats
The data for the Republican primaries 2016 in the US can be found in:
Iowa caucuses: https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/primaries/states/ia
retrieved from
https://www.iowagop.org/
New Hampshire : http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/NH-R
retrieved from
http://sos.nh.gov/2016RepPresPrim.aspx?id=8589957185
Nevada: http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/NV-R retrieved
from
http://nevadagop.org/nevada-republican-presidential-caucus-results/
Massachusetts: http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/MA-R
retrieved from
http://electionstats.state.ma.us/elections/search/year_from:2016/year_to:2016/
office_id:1/stage:Republican
Tennessee: http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/TN-R
retrieved from
https://sos.tn.gov/products/elections/election-results
Texas: http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/TX-R
retrieved from
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist273_state.htm
Michigan: http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/MI-R
retrieved from
http://miboecfr.nictusa.com/election/results/2016PPR_CENR.html
Wisconsin: http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/WI-R
retrieved from
http://elections.wi.gov/elections-voting/results/2016/spring-election-presidential-preference
3.2 Overall results
We show below data from the US elections (Republicans, Primaries, 2016, n = 8), from France
(Presidential elections, first round, 2007, 2012, and 2017, n = 8), and the Federal Republic of Germany
(Federal elections 1949-2017, n = 95) from different organizational units (city, federal state, country).
We present a semi-logarithmic representation, together with a linear fit of the data. In order to obtain
a first, overall impression about the quality of the fits, we consider R2adj in figure 5. We find that the
linear model mostly explains far more than 90% of the variability in the data.
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Figure 5: Boxplot for the R2adj values in France, Germany and the US.
In section 5, we fit according to the heuristic estimator (proposed at page 17) the parameter z; the
histogram of the logarithm of this parameter obtained from the elections in the FRG (in each election,
for two cities Munich and Stuttgart, two states Bavaria and Baden Wu¨ttemberg, and for the complete
FRG) is shown in figure 6. We find an unimodal distribution. A closer analysis of the dependency of
the number of voters and number of parties for the unit under consideration reveals a significant, but
weak dependency (R2adj = 0.4; see table in figure 6).
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intercept −3.192e+ 00 < 2e− 16
voters −1.845e− 08 1.5e− 05
parties −3.337e− 02 0.000758
Figure 6: Left: Logarithmic histogram of the parameter z. Right: Result of a linear fit of log(z) by
the number of voters n.
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4 Elections in semilogarithmic representation with linear fit
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Figure 7: Election US (republican primaries), 2016 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 8: Election US (republican primaries), 2016 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
25
2 4 6 8 10
5.
0
6.
0
7.
0
France 2017
rank
lo
g(V
o
te
rs
)
2 4 6 8 10
5.
0
5.
5
6.
0
6.
5
7.
0
France 2012
rank
lo
g(V
o
te
rs
)
2 4 6 8 10 12
5.
5
6.
0
6.
5
7.
0
France 2007
rank
lo
g(V
o
te
rs
)
Figure 9: Election France, 2017, 1012, 2007 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 10: Election France, 2017 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 11: Election FRG, 1949 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 12: Election FRG, 1953 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 13: Election FRG, 1957 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 14: Election FRG, 1961 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 15: Election FRG, 1965 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 16: Election FRG, 1969 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 17: Election FRG, 1972 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 18: Election FRG, 1976 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 19: Election FRG, 1980 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 20: Election FRG, 1983 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 21: Election FRG, 1987 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 22: Election FRG, 1990 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 23: Election FRG, 1994 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 24: Election FRG, 1998 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 25: Election FRG, 2002 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 26: Election FRG, 2005 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 27: Election FRG, 2009 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 28: Election FRG, 2013 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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Figure 29: Election FRG, 2017 (bullets: data, line: linear fit).
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5 Elections in semilogarithmic representation with model simula-
tions
In this section, we show a boxplot of 100 realization of the model (n, K and z adapted) together
with the data from the corresponding election according to the algorithm described in section 2.4.4.
The number of voters n and the number of candidates/parties K are directly taken from the data,
the relative minimal group size z is estimated according to the estimator described at page 17 (this
supplement).
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Figure 30: Election US (republicans), 2016 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 31: Election US (republicans), 2016. Note that, in case of Texas, z was estimated according to
an outlier (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 32: Election France, 2017, 1012, 2007 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 33: Election France, 2017 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 34: Election FRG, 1949 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 35: Election FRG, 1953 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 36: Election FRG, 1957 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 37: Election FRG, 1961 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 38: Election FRG, 1965 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 39: Election FRG, 1969 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 40: Election FRG, 1972 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 41: Election FRG, 1976 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 42: Election FRG, 1980 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 43: Election FRG, 1983 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 44: Election FRG, 1987 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 45: Election FRG, 1990 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 46: Election FRG, 1994 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 47: Election FRG, 1998 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 48: Election FRG, 2002 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 49: Election FRG, 2005 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 50: Election FRG, 2009 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 51: Election FRG, 2013 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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Figure 52: Election FRG, 2017 (boxplot of 100 realizations og the model, bullets: data).
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